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Abstract 
Sham marriages occur frequently and, to detect them, partners are sometimes interviewed 
together. We examined an innovative method to detect deceit in such interviews. Fifty-three 
pairs of interviewees, either friends (truth tellers) or pretended to be friends (liars), were 
interviewed about their friendship. Just before the interview, they received the questions that 
would be asked in the interview and were invited to prepare the answers. We told them that 
these pre-interview deliberations would be recorded. Based on the transcripts we analysed 
cues to truthfulness (cues expected to be expressed more by truth tellers) and cues to deceit 
(cues expected to be expressed more by liars).  Truth tellers and liars differed from each 
other, particularly regarding expressing cues to truthfulness. Pre-interview deliberations that 
are recorded with awareness of the interviewees can be used for lie detection purposes. We 
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A sham marriage is a marriage purely for the purpose of gaining an advantage 
associated with that status. Common reasons for sham marriages are to gain immigration, 
residency, work or citizenship rights for one of the spouses. Sham marriages may occur 
frequently. The estimated numbers are between 4,000 and 10,000 in the UK each year 
(Mowat, 2016), with arrests rising from 137 in 2010 to 1,545 in 2014, an increase of more 
than 840% (Mowat, 2016). In the USA it is estimated that between 5% and 30% of all 
marriages between American residents and foreign nationals were fraudulent, but that very 
few of these marriages were detected or acted upon (Seminara, 2008). We are aware of 
countries where in an effort to detect sham marriages the couples are interviewed together, 
so-called collective interviewing (Vernham & Vrij, 2015). In the current experiment we tested 
a new method to detect deceit in such interviews, by giving the couples the opportunity to 
discuss the questions that will be asked during the interview, whilst they are aware that these 
pre-interview deliberations are recorded and observed.  
 Collective interviewing has advantages for lie detection. First, it enables interviewers 
to not only analyse the nonverbal and verbal responses of each interviewee (which could also 
be assessed when interviewing people separately), but also to analyse how these interviewees 
interact and communicate with each other (which only can be assessed in collective 
interviews). Second, interventions could be introduced that are only suitable in collective 
interviewing, which could facilitate truth telling or hamper lying. An example is forced turn-
taking, whereby the interviewer asks one interviewee in the pair to start answering the 
question and then intervenes every 20 seconds by asking the other interviewee in the pair to 
continue from the point at which the partner was stopped (Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
Hillman, 2014). In such research, truth telling pairs were more likely to continue on from one 
another, whereas lying pairs were more likely to wait and repeat what their partner last said 
before continuing (Vernham et al., 2014b). In the current experiment, we examined a new 
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factor: Informing interviewees just before the interview which questions will be asked, 
allowing them to discuss their answers, and informing them that such discussions would be 
recorded. We examined verbal differences between pairs of truth tellers and pairs of liars in 
these pre-interview deliberations. Because this study was the first of its kind, we analysed 
many verbal cues. The risk of analysing a small set of cues is that some verbal cues would 
remain undetected.  
We grouped the dependent variables into six clusters we thought may reveal 
differences between truth tellers and liars, based on theory and previous research. First, we 
examined memory search, because this is relevant to truthful and deceptive story telling 
(Sporer & Schwandt, 2016; Vrij, 2014; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & Tcholakian, 2013). Second, 
we examined coming up with alternatives, because this would occur naturally in truth tellers 
but would go against the strategies liars typically employ (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 
2007). Third, we examined cognitive load, because in story telling lying is considered to be 
more mentally taxing than truth telling (Sporer, 2016; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006; 
Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003). Fourth, we examined specific strategies and 
impression management cues, thought to be prevalent in liars (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; 
Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). Fifth, we measured consistency because this is a cue 
likely to be at the forefront of liars’ minds (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013; Vredeveldt, van 
Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Finally, we examined giveaway cues of truth telling and lying 
which may occur naturally in the pairs’ discussions. 
Memory search 
When individuals collectively attempt to retrieve information from their shared 
memories, they typically communicate considerably with one another to retrieve as much 
information as possible. According to Wegner (1987), groups develop ‘transactive memory 
systems’ for retrieving information. Hollingshead (1998) refers to a transaction memory 
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search as whereby group members with shared memories attempt to increase recall by posing 
questions to each other to check or find out information and by cuing each other for further 
information. In a previous deception study it has been found that this pattern of transaction 
memory search occurred more frequently amongst truth tellers than liars (Vernham, Vrij, 
Leal, & Mann, 2014). In addition, memory of real events are embedded in location and time 
(Johnson, 1988, 1996) and research has shown that truth tellers provide more temporal and 
spatial information than liars (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004).  
Coming up with alternatives 
In their memory search of joint experiences, truth tellers may come up with more than 
one experience that would answer a particular question they are asked to prepare an answer 
for. For example, one person may remember something the other person initially did not 
think of or one person may believe they have a better example than the other person initially 
provides. Although liars may go through a similar process while thinking of answers, 
previous collective interviewing research suggests that this is less likely to happen (Vrij et al., 
2009). Liars’ dominant strategy during the actual interviews was that one person comes up 
with an idea and the other person just accepts and agrees (Vrij et al., 2009). We examined 
whether a similar pattern emerges in pre-interview deliberations. 
Cognitive load 
The task for truth tellers is probably easier than for liars. Truth tellers can openly 
consult their memories, discuss their experiences, and select the best memories for their 
answers. Liars in the current experiment do not have memories to share and therefore have to 
fabricate their answers, which is typically a more difficult task than coming up with true 
answers (Parkhouse & Ormerod, 2018). Fabricating answers is made more difficult for liars 
in the current experiment because they need to keep up the premise that they know each other 
and thus cannot openly polish their fabrications. In their pre-interview deliberations, pairs 
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may comment on the difficulty of the task at hand. If they do so, the difference in cognitive 
load between truth tellers and liars may become transparent in the comments they make. We 
examined this. 
Strategies and Impression Management 
When liars prepare themselves for interviews, they typically prepare nonverbal and 
verbal strategies to come across convincing (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007). 
Examples of nonverbal strategies are planning to avoid showing behaviours they think appear 
nervous, such as gaze aversion or fidgeting, whereas examples of verbal strategies are 
thinking of details to report that sound convincing (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, 
Woods, & Michlik, 2006; Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 
2010). Truth tellers are typically less inclined to prepare for interviews; they often indicate 
this not to be needed, because they just will tell the truth (Hartwig et al., 2007; Vrij, Mann, 
Leal, & Granhag, 2010). Planning could be beneficial for liars. Prison inmates believed that 
planning enhanced their performance in interviews (Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & 
Hartwig, 2004). In addition, two meta-analyses revealed that planning did improve the 
quality of speech (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; see Chan & Bull [2014] 
for a more recent study). Finally, another meta-analysis showed that unplanned lies were 
more frequently detected than planned lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). We listened for 
comments in the interview that revealed the planning of nonverbal and verbal strategies. 
Whilst truth tellers typically focus on their story and try to tell it as it happened, liars 
do not take their credibility for granted when telling their stories (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), and are more concerned than truth tellers about how to 
appear convincing (Vrij et al., 2008). This could mean that liars – more than truth tellers –
discuss in advance whether or not a possible response would sound convincing. We examined 
whether such discussions took place. 
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Consistency 
Compared to truth tellers, liars are more concerned with consistency (Fisher, Vrij, & 
Leins, 2013; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 
2014). Consistency is amongst the strongest beliefs about deception and people typically 
think that inconsistency constitutes lying (Strömwall et al., 2004). Liars therefore attempt to 
be consistent when interviewed about the same event multiple times (Vredeveldt et al., 2014), 
which expresses itself, amongst other cues, in the inclination to avoid omissions and 
reminiscences (adding new information) (Fisher, Leins, & Vrij, 2013). Although in the 
present interview, interviewees were only interviewed once, this inclination to be consistent 
may also become apparent when comparing what the interviewees agreed in the pre-interview 
deliberations that they would say in the interview with what they actually said in the 
interview.  
Giveaway cues 
In the pre-interview deliberations truth tellers and liars may implicitly make clear that 
they do or do not know each other. For example, truth tellers may refer to shared knowledge 
without making it explicit (e.g. PP1: “I am worried about John” PP2: “Yes, he never got over 
splitting up with Jane”), whereas liars may ask each other questions which reveals that they 
do not know each other well (“What do you study?”). Another possibility is that liars start 
openly fabricating possible answers to questions (“Let’s say that…”). The ‘lying’ examples 
may indicate that liars did not follow the instructions well. Indeed, such cues occurred in the 
group of liars that we discuss in the supplementary materials (see below). However, the truth 
telling example would be in alignment with the instructions. We investigated the occurrence 
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Hypotheses 
We tested the following hypotheses: 
Truth tellers will show more signs of memory search than liars (Hypothesis 1) 
Truth tellers will come up with more alternatives than liars (Hypothesis 2) 
Truth tellers will report that they found the task easier than liars (Hypothesis 3) 
Liars will discuss more strategies than truth tellers (Hypothesis 4) 
Liars will discuss more impression management issues than truth tellers (Hypothesis 
5) 
Liars will show more consistency than truth tellers between their pre-discussion 
answers and actual interview answers (Hypothesis 6) 




Participants were recruited via a participant data base, online advertising using both 
student and staff portals and via word of mouth. Participants were either recruited as pairs, 
with the requirement that they had known each other socially for a period of longer than 12 
months, or as individuals and placed with a partner on the day of the experiment.  
A total of 154 participants (77 pairs) took part in the experiment, comprising of 39 
males (25.3%) and 112 females (72.7%). Three individuals did not provide their gender. The 
mean age of participants was 22.53 years (SD = 6.37). Truth telling pairs (n = 26) were those 
who had known each other socially for more than 12 months, whilst lying pairs (n = 51) were 
those who were placed with a partner (unknown to them) on the day. The 51 lying pairs were 
comprised of two groups; pairs who were just told that their discussion would be recorded (n 
= 24) and pairs who were told that apart from their interviews being recorded, someone was 
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watching their preparation discussions through a one-way mirror (n = 27). We introduced this 
second group of liars after data collection had started, because after observing a few pre-
interview deliberations with liars, we noticed that some of them gave giveaway cues or 
openly fabricated answers. We can only speculate why did happened, see the Discussion 
section. Since the manipulation for the first group of liars was probably not strong enough, 
we do not discuss their results, but they are available in the supplementary materials. A 
comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that more cues to deceit occurred in the truth tellers - 
first group of liars comparison (Table 3) than in the truth tellers – second group of liars 
condition (Table 2), particularly amongst verbal strategies, giveaway cues and openly 
fabricating answers. The final sample consisted of 106 participants (53 pairs), comprising of 
30 males (28.3%) and 74 females (69.8%). Two individuals did not provide their gender. The 
mean age of participants was 22.41 years (SD = 5.61). 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival at the Psychology Department, participants were informed that they 
would be interviewed about their friendship; lying pairs were told that they would need to 
feign this friendship. No further instructions were given in relation to the nature of the 
interview. Participants were not informed whether their interview would be together or 
separate. If participants asked the experimenter, she replied that she did not know. To 
motivate participants to perform well during the experiment, they were informed that if the 
interviewer believed their account, they would be entered into the prize draw to win £150 
(£75 each). However, if the interviewer did not believe their account (i.e., did not believe that 
they were true friends), they would not be added to the prize draw and would be required to 
write a secondary statement pertaining to their friendship for the interviewer. 
All participants were then given time to prepare for this interview about their alleged 
friendship by having coffee at a local café. Each pair was given £10 for coffee and asked to 
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return to the department after 30 minutes. First, they were then asked to complete a pre-
interview questionnaire, which they were asked to complete truthfully, irrespective of their 
veracity status. The pre-interview questionnaire collected simple demographics such as age, 
gender and student/staff status. Participants were also asked to rate their level of motivation 
to perform well during the interview (ranging from [1] extremely unmotivated to [7] 
extremely motivated). Truth tellers, but not liars, were asked for how long they knew each 
other (in months) and how much time the pairs spent together, on average, per month (type of 
response ranged from hours to days, and hours were divided by 8 to provide overall ‘days’ 
spent together). They were also asked to rate their friendship on 7- point Likert scales for how 
well they knew one another (ranging from [1] strangers to [7] best friends), closeness 
(ranging from [1] distant to [7] intimate), level of importance (ranging from [1] unimportant 
to [7] important), and level of trust (ranging from [1] distrusting to [7] trusting). The answers 
were clustered into one variable, labelled friendship strength (Cronbach’s alpha = .825). For 
truth tellers, the three variables length of friendship, overall days spent together, and 
friendship strength were then correlated with all 21 dependent variables listed in Table 2. 
Only four out of these 63 correlations (6% of the variables) were significant, which could be 
expected by chance alone. We can thus conclude that length of friendship, overall days spent 
together, and friendship strength had no effect on the dependent variables. 
Participants were then informed that they would be given the questions that would be 
asked by the interviewer and that they had ten minutes to prepare. They were told that this 
preparation time would be audio and video recorded (truth tellers and initial group of liars 
whose data are not reported) or they were told that this preparation time would be audio and 
video recorded and that the experimenter would also be watching their preparation time 
through a one-way mirror (liars whose data are reported). Audio and video recording and 
observing through a one-way mirror all actually took place. The four questions provided were 
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the exact questions that the interviewer would ask during the interview and describe a wide 
range of issues that we thought real friends should be able to talk about in some detail: (1) 
“Please can you describe how you became friends?”; (2) “Please can you describe the 
funniest event that has happened when you have been together?”; (3) “Please describe the 
most stupid thing you have ever witnessed your friend saying or doing?”, and (4) “Please 
describe the most recent activity you carried out together before today?” 
The participants were given ten minutes for these audio and video recorded pre-
interview deliberations. After ten minutes, an interviewer, blind to the veracity status of the 
interviewees entered the room, introduced him/herself and then asked the four questions the 
participants had prepared to answer. When the interview was over, the interviewer thanked 
the participants and left the room. The audio and video recording equipment were then turned 
off. 
Following the interview, participants were asked to complete a post-interview 
questionnaire. Again, they were reminded to answer truthfully, irrespective of their veracity 
status. In this questionnaire, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they told the 
truth in the interview (as a percentage) on an 11- point Likert scale ranging from [0] 0% to 
[10] 100%. In addition, they were asked to rate on 7- point Likert scales, how likely they 
thought they (1) would be entered into the prize draw and (2) would have to provide a written 
statement (ranging from [1] not at all to [7] very likely). We also asked participants the extent 
to which they anticipated that (1) their ten minutes preparation time was going to be audio 
and video recorded and (2) that they were interviewed as a pair (ranging from [1] anticipated 
to [7] unanticipated). Note that these two questions refer to their anticipation that their 
conversations would be monitored and collective interviewing would take place, not to the 
fact that this monitoring and collective interviewing actually took place after being informed 
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about it. Finally, participants were asked how difficult they found it being interviewed as a 
pair (ranging from [1] easy to [7] difficult).  
When the post-interview was complete, participants were debriefed about the nature 
of the study and also paid £10 for their participation. All participants were told that their 
account had been believed by the interviewer and that they would be entered into the prize 
draw.  
Coding 
 One coder coded all the 77 interviews, whereas a second coder coded a random 
sample of 20 interviews. Both coders were blind to the Veracity status and hypotheses. The 
first coder coded the first ten interviews and discussed her coding with the first author. The 
first coder then coded the remaining 67 interviews and a second coder the random sample of 
20 interviews. The presence or absence of a verbal cue was recorded for each question and 
the results of the four questions were averaged. Each score could thus vary from 0 (never 
present) to 4 (present in all questions). The exception to this was the joint experience 
variable, for which the number of reported joint experiences were counted. Table 2 provides 
an overview of the variables that were coded. 
For the Memory variables, we coded whether a participant reported an experience in 
terms of time (e.g. “Remember when you slipped in the snow last Christmas”) or location 
(e.g., “Remember when we walked to Fratton”), provided cues to each other (e.g., PP1: “We 
went to the library”, PP2: “True!, on Friday”) and finished each other’s sentence (e.g., PP1: 
“We had six pints each”, PP2” “Six pints of beer”). The Cambridge English dictionary 
defines the word remember as ‘to be able to bring back a piece of information into your 
mind’. Since this activity should reflect the act of truth tellers more than liars, we examined 
whether truth tellers also actually said the word ‘remember’ more than liars. 
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For the Alternatives variables, we coded whether more than one answer alternative 
was discussed between the pair. For questions 2 and 3, we also coded how many different 
experiences the participants reported.  
For the Cognitive load variables, we coded whether participants explicitly mentioned 
that a question would be difficult or easy to answer. For Impression Management, we coded 
whether they discussed whether a given answer would sound credible (E.g., “If you say that, 
it is going to confuse the interviewer”) or embarrassing (E.g., “It makes us sound like such 
children”). We also coded swearing and making jokes (E.g., PP1: “What’s the most stupid 
thing you've ever witnessed me doing?” PP2: “That’s like every day”). For Strategies, we 
made a distinction between verbal strategies (E.g., “Maybe we should give lots of details 
when answering the questions”) and nonverbal strategies (E.g.’ “Make sure we are smiling 
and laughing to make it real”). 
For the Consistency variables, we compared what the participants in the pre-interview 
deliberations agreed to say in the interview with what they actually said during the interview. 
Elaboration within a topic means that they discussed what to say in the pre-interview 
deliberations but said more about it in the actual interview. Elaboration new means that they 
said something in the interview they did not discuss in the pre-interview deliberations. 
Omission means that they discussed something in the pre-interview deliberations but left out 
of the interview.  
For Giveaway cues, we coded whether they said something that reveals that they 
knew each other (E.g., “But you always say that I cannot talk about that”) or that they did not 
know each other (E.g., “My heater, I live in student halls, my heater doesn’t really work”).  
 To measure inter-rater reliability between the two coders, the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency was used (Single Measures ICCs). They are reported in the 
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 Seven ANOVAs were carried out with Veracity as the only factor and the seven 
variables presented in Table 1 as dependent variables.  
 Truth tellers rated their truthfulness as significantly higher than liars, thought it would 
be more likely they would be entered in the prize draws and thought it less likely that they 
would have to write a statement. This indicates that the manipulation check was successful. 
Truth tellers also anticipated less than liars that the pre-interview deliberations would be 
recorded and found it easier than liars to be interviewed together. 
No Veracity differences emerged for motivation and anticipation of being interviewed 
together. The average mean scores indicated that participants were highly motivated and 
somewhat surprised to be interviewed together.  
Hypotheses-testing 
A MANOVA was carried out with Veracity as factor and the 21 variables listed in 
Table 2 as dependent variables. We also report the Cohen d’s and Bayes Factors, BF10. A BF10 
smaller than 1 indicates evidence for the absence of an effect (support of the null hypothesis); 
BFs between 1 and 3 suggest weak evidence, BFs between 3 and 10 suggest strong evidence 
and BFs > 10 very strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). We used 
the default Cauchy’s prior of .707 for the Bayesian t-tests (Lakens, 2016). 
 The multivariate effect was significant, F(20,32) = 3.12, p = .002, ηp
2 = .66i. At a 
univariate level, six significant differences emerged and they are indicated with ‘*’ in Table 2. 
Liars, compared to truth tellers, provided more cues to each other. Truth tellers, compared to 
liars, (i) finished each other sentence more often, (ii) discussed more than one alternative per 
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question, (iii) discussed more experiences in the pre-interview deliberations, (iv) expressed 
more frequently that reporting a specific event would be embarrassing, and (v) gave more 
cues that they knew each other. This means that Hypotheses 1, 3, 4 and 6 were rejected, that 
we found limited support for Hypothesis 5, and 7 and that we found strong support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
The Bayes Factor analyses showed weak evidence for the finishing sentences and 
embarrassment effects but strong to very strong evidence for the remaining four effects. The 
Bayes Factors further showed mostly absence of evidence for the non-significant results.  
Discussion 
 In the current experiment, truth tellers’ and liars’ pre-interview deliberations were 
recorded and analysed. We examined cues to truthfulness (cues expected to be expressed 
more by truth tellers) and cues to deceit (cues expected to be expressed more by liars). Fewer 
cues to deceit (one) than cues to truthfulness (five) emerged in the experiment. In other 
words, liars were able to avoid showing cues to deceit, but could not fully replicate the verbal 
cues truth tellers did report. This reflects verbal lie detection in general, where in research 
many more cues to truthfulness have emerged than cues to deceit. For example, Criteria-
Based Content Analysis -a widely researched verbal veracity assessment tool- contains 19 
criteria, all of them cues to truthfulness (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016). In addition, 
Reality Monitoring –another widely researched verbal veracity assessment tool- contains only 
one cue to deceit, cognitive operations, but that cue does not seem to discriminate truth tellers 
from liars (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). The absence of verbal cues to deceit is 
unfortunate because a mixture of cues to truthfulness and deceit creates the opportunity to 
create within-subjects measures, e.g., the proportion of cues to truthfulness (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, 
& Harvey, 2018). Within-subjects measures are desirable (Vrij, 2016, 2019) because they can 
control for individual differences, such as how talkative an interviewee is (Nahari & Pazuelo, 
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2015; Nahari & Vrij, 2014). Within-subjects comparisons may also help investigators to make 
judgements in individual cases, when cut-off scores can be established (Vrij, 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, researchers recently pleaded for the search of verbal cues to deceit (Nahari et 
al., 2019).  
 The only cue to deceit we found -liars providing more cues to each other than truth 
tellers- was unexpected as we predicted the opposite to occur. In general, we expected 
memory cues to occur more often in discussions amongst truth tellers than amongst liars –as 
was found before in deception research (Masip et al., 2005; Vernham et al., 2014)- but the 
findings were erratic. The only support we found was a weak effect that truth tellers finished 
each other sentences more than liars. Perhaps differences between truth tellers and liars may 
emerge if different variables are taken into account, such as repeating or summarising each 
other (Vredeveldt, 2018). In addition, since collaborative remembering is facilitated through 
effective communication styles between the group members (e.g., elaborations, explanations, 
repetitions, reinstatements, Harris, Keil, Sutton, Barnier, & McILwain, 2011; Meade, Nokes, 
& Morrow, 2009), encouraging pairs to use such strategies may reveal differences between 
truth tellers and liars. Although Vredeveldt (2018) found no beneficial effect on memory 
recall of instructing truth telling partners to repeat each other or to elaborate upon each 
other’s statements, this does not rule out that such an instruction may elicit differences 
between truth tellers and liars.  
 Two cues in particular revealed very strong Veracity effects: In the pre-discussion 
truth tellers (i) discussed more alternatives per question, and (ii) discussed more experiences. 
Unlike liars, who had to fabricate an answer, truth tellers could tap into their memories and 
they apparently showed that in the pre-discussion. Thus, rather than the way how they 
discussed their alleged memories (the memory variables), it was evidence of the richness of 
these alleged memories that discriminated truth tellers from liars. Thus, interview protocols 
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that focus on the richness of the to-be-discussed memories may be particularly successful in 
distinguishing truth tellers from liars. It may hereby be important not to prompt the pairs to 
recall as many memories as possible as this may give hints to liars what the interviewer is 
looking for, which could diminish the effect. That is, open-ended requests “Tell me all you 
remember” are more effective for lie detection purposes than specific requests “Describe the 
man you saw”, because to the latter specific requests both truth tellers and liars may provide 
similarly detailed answers (Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 2015). 
 Two more cues to truthfulness occurred: Truth tellers expressed more frequently than 
liars that reporting a specific event would be embarrassing, and gave more cues to each other 
that they knew each other. The ‘embarrassment cue’ effect was weak, which means that 
replication of the effect is required before any conclusions can be drawn. The ‘know each 
other cues’ effect was stronger and it is worth examining whether this effect becomes stronger 
when using interview protocols focusing on the richness of alleged memories.  
 Many cues were not related to deception. For example, comments about how easy or 
difficult the task was did not distinguish truth tellers from both groups of liars, although the 
group liars, more than truth tellers, reported in the post-interview questionnaire that they 
found the interview setting difficult. In other words, liars may have experienced more 
cognitive load than truth tellers, but did not say so in the pre-interview deliberations. In 
addition, liars typically take their credibility less for granted than truth tellers (DePaulo et al., 
2013; Gilovitch et al., 1998), but liars did not discuss more than truth tellers how to phrase 
answers and how credible such answers would sound. Also, liars typically think that their 
nonverbal behaviour gives away that they are lying, but liars did not discuss their nonverbal 
strategies more than truth tellers. Despite the absence of effects, we still believe that liars 
were more concerned with impression management than truth tellers. We believe that they did 
not reveal it because they were aware that their discussions were recorded and that such 
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discussions would be a giveaway sign of heir deception. Finally, the consistency findings did 
not reveal differences between truth tellers and liars. Although this goes against the 
widespread belief that truth tellers are more consistent than liars (Strömwall et al., 2014) it is 
in alignment with reviews that showed that truth tellers and liars are often equally consistent 
[Fisher et al., 2013; Vredeveldt et al., 2014]).  
We initially told liars only that their pre-interview deliberations would be recorded. 
This resulted in many differences between truth tellers and liars particularly amongst verbal 
strategies, giveaway cues and openly fabricating answers (see Table 3 in the Supplementary 
Materials). We can only speculate why this happened. One reason is that liars thought that the 
recordings would not be analysed until after the interview. Such a thought would have been 
reasonable given that liars were aware that the interview would take place directly after the 
pre-interview deliberations. They may thus have thought that it may not be too damaging for 
them to give away their veracity status in the pre-interview deliberations.  
 When we told liars that their pre-interview deliberations would be observed also 
through a one-way mirror the obvious cues to deception were no longer present. In that 
scenario, only relatively few cues we examined (six out of 21) discriminated truth tellers 
from liars. This took us by surprise. It turned out to be less effective than we initially thought. 
This underlines the common finding in deception research that differences between truth 
tellers and liars are typically subtle (DePaulo et al., 2003) and difficult to spot (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). In hindsight, it provides additional justification to our decision to examine so 
many cues, because if we would have focused on a specific smaller set of cues, we may have 
found fewer differences or no differences at all. We are aware that obtaining relatively few 
significant effects and having relatively many hypotheses unsupported, may raise doubts 
about the validity of the findings. Such doubts may be further strengthened because several 
cues we examined lacked a strong theoretical foundation and were selected based on previous 
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research. We thus believe that replication is required before recommendations can be made to 
practitioners about introducing the tested manipulation in the field.  
Methodological Considerations 
 Four methodological considerations are worth discussing. First, in the current 
experiment, we had to strengthen the instruction provided to liars by informing them that the 
pre-interview deliberations would also be observed through a one-way mirror. As a result, we 
gave thus different instructions to liars and truth tellers, creating a confound. The results need 
to be replicated in an experiment without such a confound. Second, we could have chosen 
other categories of question, such as questions about personality traits. Third, in real life 
being caught out in a sham marriage could result in serious consequences, including 
deportation, whereas our experimental situation was a low-stakes scenario. At present, we 
have no convincing theoretical argument as to why a high-stakes situation would strengthen 
or weaken the results or leave them unchanged. This thus remains an empirical question.  
Fourth, liars in our experiment could only briefly prepare themselves (they were  
sent to a local café and asked to return to the department after 30 minutes) and they probably 
have more preparation time in real life. A longer preparation time only benefits liars if their 
preparations are related to the questions asked in the interview (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). 
Investigators can ask questions about all sorts of areas including questions that liars in all 
likelihood have not anticipated. Fifth, participants in the experiment self-selected to 
participate either as pairs of friends or as individuals. This creates, in theory, the possibility of 
group non-equivalence. This friend –no friend confound should be avoided in a future 
replication study.  
Future Research 
This is the first experiment in which pre-interview deliberations between pairs of truth 
tellers and liars were recorded and coded. We believe that the findings show potential for use 
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in interviews aimed at detecting sham marriages, although there is a need for the present set 
of findings to be replicated, as discussed above. We therefore encourage researchers to carry 
out such a replication. We also hope that this experiment will make researchers enthusiastic 
about this new domain of research and make them to decide carrying out their own research 
in this area. To stimulate such research, we give a wide range of possible research venues. 
First, perhaps interview protocols could be designed further highlighting the differences in 
richness of memory between truth tellers and liars. Second, through specific instructions 
perhaps differences in how truth tellers and liars discuss their alleged memories could be 
elicited. Third, it would be useful to search for cues that liars display, so that within-subjects 
comparisons can be made (e.g., proportion of cues to truthfulness), which may help 
investigators in making decisions in individual cases. Fourth, in the current experiment we 
focused on the pre-interview deliberations and on the consistency between these discussions 
and the answers given in the actual interview. A logical next step would be to broaden the 
horizon and examine the effect of such pre-interview deliberations on the quality of the actual 
interviews. Fifth, in the current experiment, an experimenter was watching the pre-interview 
deliberations in the liars condition. In future research, the actual interviewer could watch the 
pre-interview deliberations, which we think would increase pressure on liars. Sixth, future 
research could examine the effectiveness of interview questions other than about experiences, 
for example about personality traits. Finally, perhaps in future research a control group could 
be included in the design. One such a control group could be truth-tellers and liars who are 
asked to prepare themselves in recorded pre-interview deliberations but without having the 
questions given to them. Another control group could be truth tellers and liars whose 
interviews are secretly recorded. This probably would lead to two groups of liars, naïve liars 
who would have no idea that they would be recorded and more suspicious liars who may 
have thought that recordings took place. We expect the first naïve group of liars to give 
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obvious cues to deception, similar or even stronger cues than the group of liars in the present 
experiment whose results are discussed in the supplementary materials. The more suspicious 
group of liars are in our opinion more likely to show responses similar to the group of liars 
whose results are discussed in the main text.  
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Table 1 
Questionnaire Variables as a Function of Veracity 
 Truth tellers  Liars    
 M SD 95% CI  M SD 95% CI F p ηp
2
 
Motivation 5.94 0.78 5.70, 6.19  5.79 0.93 5.56, 6.03 .80 .372 .01 
Truthfulness 98.17 3.84 91.60,104.74  19.43 32.01 13.19, 25.67 310.12 < .001 .75 
Likelihood 
prize 
6.48 0.83 6.16, 6.80  4.94 1.34 4.64, 5.25 49.99 < .001 .33 
Likelihood 
statement 




3.54 2.37 2.90, 4.18  3.25 2.32 2.61, 3.88 .41 .523 .00 
Anticipation 
recording 
3.48 1.73 3.02, 3.94  4.13 1.45 3.70, 4.57 4.36 .039 .04 
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Table 2 
Dependent Variables as a Function of Veracity: ANOVA Results 
 ICC Truth tellers   Liars      
  M SD 95% CI   M SD 95% CI F p ηp
2
 d BF10 
MEMORY               
Said remember .88 1.23 1.21 0.72,1.75   1.59 1.65 1.09,2.10 0.83 .368 .02  .25 (-.30, .78) 0.388 
Time context .81 0.81 1.06 0.46,1.16   1.00 0.78 0.66,1.34 0.57 .455 .01 .21 (-.35, .75) 0.349 
Location context .63 1.23 0.99 0.82,1.65   1.78 1.05 1.37,2.19 3.79 .057 .07 .54 (-.02, 1.08) 1.290 
*Providing cues .72 0.19 0.63 -0.12,.51   0.85 0.95 0.55,1.16 8.79 .005 .15 .82 (.24, 1.36) 8.886 
*Finish sentence .76 0.54 0.81 0.32,0.75   0.15 0.36 -.06,0.36 4.57 .013 .11 .63 (.07, 1.17) 2.230 
ALTERNATIVES               
*More than one 
alternative 
discussed 
.69 2.54 1.03 2.15,2.93   1.11 0.98 0.73,1.50 26.92 < .001 .35 1.43 (.80, 2.01) 408.312 
*Experiences 
reported 
.86 6.73 3.91 5.72,7.74   2.96 1.37 1.97,3.95 22.12 < .001 .30 1.29 (0.67, 1.86) 928.055 
COGNITIVE 
LOAD 
              
Difficult to answer .64 0.12 0.43 -.04,0.27   0.25 0.44 -.04,0.26 .002 .967 .00 .30 (0.25, .84) 0.276 
Easy to answer 1.00 0.15 0.37 0.02,0.29     0.15 0.37 0.02,0.28 .003 .955 .00 .00, -.54, .54) 0.267 
STRATEGY               
Verbal strategy 1.00 0.00 0.00 -.16,0.16   0.15 0.46 -.01,0.31 2.74 .104 .05 .46 (-.10, 1.00) 0.847 
Nonverbal strategy 1.00 0.00 0.00 -.09,0.09   0.00 0.00 -.09,0.09      
IMPRESSION 
MANAGEMENT 
              
Perceived 
credibility 
.64 0.08 0.27 -.14,0.29   0.11 0.42 0.10,0.32 .121 .729 .00 .08 (-.46, .62) 0.290 
*Perceived 
embarrassment 
.88 0.38 0.64 0.22,0.55   0.07 0.27 -.09,0.24 5.43 .024 .10 .64 (.07, 1.18) 2.456 
Swearing .88 1.23 1.03 0.86,1.60   0.70 0.91 0.34,1.07 3.89 .054 .07 .55 (-.01, 1.09) 1.341 
Jokes .77 0.65 0.89 0.37,0.94   0.41 0.74 0.13,0.69 1.19 .280 .02 .38 (-.17, .92) 0.451 
CONSISTENCY               
Elaboration within .62 2.85 0.97 2.46,3.23   3.19 0.88 2.81,3.56 1.79 .187 .03 .37 (-.18, .90) 0.575 
Elaboration new .61 1.96 0.92 1.58,2.34   1.52 0.98 1.14,1.89 2.90 .095 .05 .46 (-.09, 1.00) 0.903 
Omission .77 1.85 1.26 1.41,2.28   1.37 0.79 0.94,1.80 2.75 .104 .05 .42 (-.13, .96) 0.849 
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GIVEAWAY 
CUES 
              
*Know each other  .74 0.92 0.93 0.69,1.15   0.11 0.32 -.11,0.34 18.18 < .001 .26 1.17 (.57, 1.74) 3.156 
Did not know each 
other 
.86 0.08 0.27 -.20,0.35   0.26 0.59 -.01,0.53 2.04 .160 .04 .39 (-.16, .93) 0.637 














                                                 
 
i Discussing nonverbal strategies did not occur, and this variable did therefore not contribute to the multivariate effect. 
